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Abstract. In this paper, we show that Markov’s principle is not derivable in dependent
type theory with natural numbers and one universe. One way to prove this would be to
remark that Markov’s principle does not hold in a sheaf model of type theory over Cantor
space, since Markov’s principle does not hold for the generic point of this model [CMR17].
Instead we design an extension of type theory, which intuitively extends type theory by the
addition of a generic point of Cantor space. We then show the consistency of this extension
by a normalization argument. Markov’s principle does not hold in this extension, and it
follows that it cannot be proved in type theory.
Introduction
Markov’s principle has a special status in constructive mathematics. One way to formulate
this principle is that if it is impossible that a given algorithm does not terminate, then it does
terminate. It is equivalent to the fact (Post’s theorem) that if a set of natural number and
its complement are both computably enumerable, then this set is decidable [TvD88, Ch4].
This form is often used in recursion theory. This principle was first formulated by Markov,
who called it “Leningrad’s principle”, and founded a branch of constructive mathematics
around this principle [Mar95].
This principle is also equivalent to the fact that if a given real number is not equal to 0
then this number is apart from 0 (that is this number is < −r or > r for some rational number
r > 0). On this form, it was explicitly refuted by Brouwer in intuitionistic mathematics, who
gave an example of a real number (well defined intuitionistically) which is not equal to 0,
but also not apart from 0. (The motivation of Brouwer for this example was to show the
necessity of using negation in intuitionistic mathematics [Bro75].) The idea of Brouwer can
be represented formally using topological models [vD78].
In a neutral approach to mathematics, such as Bishop’s [Bis67], Markov’s principle is
simply left undecided. We also expect to be able to prove that Markov’s principle is not
provable in formal system in which we can express Bishop’s mathematics. For instance,
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Kreisel [Kre59] introduced modified realizability to show that Markov’s principle is not
derivable in the formal system HAω. Similarly, one would expect that Markov’s principle is
not derivable in Martin-Lo¨f type theory [ML72], but, as far as we know, such a result has
not been established yet. 1
We say that a statement A is independent of some formal system if A cannot be derived
in that system. A statement in the formal system of Martin-Lo¨f type theory (MLTT)
is represented by a closed type. A statement/type A is derivable if it is inhabited by
some term t (written MLTT ` t :A). This is the so-called propositions-as-types principle.
Correspondingly we say that a statement A (represented as a type) is independent of MLTT
if there is no term t such that MLTT ` t :A.
The main result of this paper is to show that Markov’s principle is independent of
Martin-Lo¨f type theory.2
The main idea for proving this independence is to follow Brouwer’s argument. We want
to extend type theory with a “generic” infinite sequence of 0 and 1 and establish that it
is both absurd that this generic sequence is never 0, but also that we cannot show that
it has to take the value 0. To add such a generic sequence is exactly like adding a Cohen
real [Coh63] in forcing extension of set theory. A natural attempt for doing this will be to
consider a topological model of type theory (sheaf model over Cantor space), extending the
work [vD78] to type theory. However, while it is well understood how to represent universes
in presheaf model [HS99], it has turned out to be surprisingly difficult to represent universes
in sheaf models, see [XE16], [Str05]. Also see [CMR17] for a possible solution. Our approach
is here instead a purely syntactical description of a forcing extension of type theory (refining
previous work of [CJ10]), which contains a formal symbol for the generic sequence and a
proof that it is absurd that this generic sequence is never 0, together with a normalization
theorem, from which we can deduce that we cannot prove that this generic sequence has to
take the value 0. Since this formal system is an extension of type theory, the independence
of Markov’s principle follows.
As stated in [KN01], which describes an elegant generalization of this principle in
type theory, Markov’s principle is an important technical tool for proving termination of
computations, and thus can play a crucial role if type theory is extended with general
recursion as in [CS87].
This paper is organized as follows. We first describe the rules of the version of type
theory we are considering. This version can be seen as a simplified version of type theory
as represented in the system Agda [Nor07], and in particular, contrary to the work [CJ10],
we allow η-conversion, and we express conversion as judgment. Markov’s principle can be
formulated in a natural way in this formal system. We describe then the forcing extension
of type theory, where we add a Cohen real. For proving normalization, we follow Tait’s
computability method [Tai67, ML72], but we have to consider an extension of this with a
computability relation in order to interpret the conversion judgment. This can be seen as a
forcing extension of the technique used in [AS12]. Using this computability argument, it is
then possible to show that we cannot show that the generic sequence has to take the value 0.
1The paper [HO93] presents a model of the calculus of constructions using the idea of modified realizability,
and it seems possible to use also this technique to interpret the type theory we consider and prove in this
way the independence of Markov’s principle.
2Some authors define independence in the stronger sense “A statement is independent of a formal system
if neither the statement nor its negation is provable in the system”, e.g. [Kun80]. We will also establish the
independence of Markov’s principle in this stronger sense.
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We end by a refinement of this method, giving a consistent extension of type theory where
the negation of Markov’s principle is provable.
1. Type theory and forcing extension
The syntax of our type theory is given by the grammar:
t, u,A,B :=x | recN0(λx.A) | recN1(λx.A) t | recN2(λx.A) t u | recN(λx.A) t u
| U | N | N0 | N1 | N2 | 0 | 1 | S t | Π(x :A)B | λx.t | t u | Σ(x :A)B | (t, u) | t.1 | t.2
We use the notation n as a short hand for the term Sn 0, where S is the successor
constructor. We will use the symbol := for definitional equality in the metatheory.
1.1. Type system. We describe a type theory with one universe a` la Russell, natural
numbers, functional extensionality and surjective pairing, hereafter referred to as MLTT.3
Natural numbers:
Γ `
Γ ` N
Γ `
Γ ` 0 :N
Γ ` n :N
Γ ` Sn :N
Γ ` n = m :N
Γ ` Sn = Sm :N
Γ, x :N ` F Γ ` a0 :F [0] Γ ` g :Π(x :N)(F [x]→ F [Sx])
Γ ` recN(λx.F ) a0 g :Π(x :N)F
Γ, x :N ` F Γ ` a0 :F [0] Γ ` g :Π(x :N)(F [x]→ F [Sx])
Γ ` recN(λx.F ) a0 g 0 = a0 :F [0]
Γ, x :N ` F Γ ` a0 :F [0] Γ ` n :N Γ ` g :Π(x :N)(F [x]→ F [Sx])
Γ ` recN(λx.F ) a0 g (Sn) = g n (recN(λx.F ) a0 g n) :F [Sn]
Γ, x :N ` F = G Γ ` a0 = b0 :F [0] Γ ` g = h :Π(x :N)(F [x]→ F [Sx])
Γ ` recN(λx.F ) a0 g = recN(λx.G) b0 h :Π(x :N)F
Booleans:
Γ `
Γ ` N2
Γ `
Γ ` 0 :N2
Γ `
Γ ` 1 :N2
Γ, x :N2 ` F Γ ` a0 :F [0] Γ ` a1 :F [1]
Γ ` recN2(λx.F ) a0 a1 :Π(x :N2)F
Γ, x :N2 ` F Γ ` a0 :F [0] Γ ` a1 :F [1]
Γ ` recN2(λx.F ) a0 a1 0 = a0 :F [0]
Γ, x :N2 ` F Γ ` a0 :F [0] Γ ` a1 :F [1]
Γ ` recN2(λx.F ) a0 a1 1 = a1 :F [1]
Γ, x :N2 ` F = G Γ ` a0 = b0 :F [0] Γ ` a1 = b1 :F [1]
Γ ` recN2(λx.F ) a0 a1 = recN2(λx.G) b0 b1 :Π(x :N2)F
Unit Type:
Γ `
Γ ` N1
Γ `
Γ ` 0 :N1
Γ, x :N1 ` F Γ ` a :F [0]
Γ ` recN1(λx.F ) a :Π(x :N1)F
Γ, x :N1 ` F Γ ` a :F [0]
Γ ` recN1(λx.F ) a 0 = a :F [0]
Γ, x :N1 ` F = G Γ ` a = b :F [0]
Γ ` recN1(λx.F ) a = recN1(λx.G) b :Π(x :N1)F
3This is a type system similar to Martin-lo¨f’s [ML72] except that we have η-conversion and surjective
pairing.
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Empty type:
Γ `
Γ ` N0
Γ, x :N0 ` F
Γ ` recN0(λx.F ) :Π(x :N0)F
Γ, x :N0 `p F = G
Γ ` recN0(λx.F ) = recN0(λx.G) :Π(x :N0)F
Dependent functions:
Γ ` F Γ, x :F ` G
Γ ` Π(x :F )G
Γ ` F = H Γ, x :F ` G = E
Γ ` Π(x :F )G = Π(x :H)E
Γ, x :F ` t :G
Γ ` λx.t :Π(x :F )G
Γ ` g :Π(x :F )G Γ ` a :F
Γ ` g a :G[a]
Γ ` g :Π(x :F )G Γ ` u = v :F
Γ ` g u = g v :G[u]
Γ ` h = g :Π(x :F )G Γ ` u :F
Γ ` hu = g u :G[u]
Γ, x :F ` t :G Γ ` a :F
Γ ` (λx.t)a = t[a] :G[a]
Γ ` h :Π(x :F )G Γ ` g :Π(x :F )G Γ, x :F ` hx = g x :G[x]
Γ ` h = g :Π(x :F )G
Dependent pairs:
Γ ` F Γ, x :F ` G
Γ ` Σ(x :F )G
Γ ` F = H Γ, x :F ` G = E
Γ ` Σ(x :F )G = Σ(x :H)E
Γ, x :F ` G Γ ` a :F Γ ` b :G[a]
Γ ` (a, b) :Σ(x :F )G
Γ ` t :Σ(x :F )G
Γ ` t.1:F
Γ ` t :Σ(x :F )G
Γ ` t.2:G[t.1]
Γ, x :F ` G Γ ` t :F Γ ` u :G[t]
Γ ` (t, u).1 = t :F
Γ, x :F ` G Γ ` t :F Γ ` u :G[t]
Γ ` (t, u).2 = u :G[t]
Γ ` t = u :Σ(x :F )G
Γ ` t.1 = u.1:F
Γ ` t = u :Σ(x :F )G
Γ ` t.2 = u.2:G[t.1]
Γ ` t :Σ(x :F )G Γ ` u :Σ(x :F )G Γ ` t.1 = u.1:F Γ ` t.2 = u.2:G[t.1]
Γ ` t = u :Σ(x :F )G
Universe:
Γ `
Γ ` U
Γ ` F :U
Γ ` F
Γ ` F = G :U
Γ ` F = G
Γ `
Γ ` N0 :U
Γ `
Γ ` N1 :U
Γ `
Γ ` N2 :U
Γ `
Γ ` N :U
Γ ` F :U Γ, x :F ` G :U
Γ ` Π(x :F )G :U
Γ ` F = H :U Γ, x :F ` G = E :U
Γ ` Π(x :F )G = Π(x :H)E :U
Γ ` F :U Γ, x :F ` G :U
Γ ` Σ(x :F )G :U
Γ ` F = H :U Γ, x :F ` G = E :U
Γ ` Σ(x :F )G = Σ(x :H)E :U
Congruence:
Γ ` F
Γ ` F = F
Γ ` F = G
Γ ` G = F
Γ ` F = G Γ ` G = H
Γ ` F = H
Γ ` t :F
Γ ` t = t :F
Γ ` t = u :F
Γ ` u = t :F
Γ ` t = u :F Γ ` u = v :F
Γ ` t = v :F
Γ ` t :F Γ ` F = G
Γ ` t :G
Γ ` t = u :F Γ ` F = G
Γ ` t = u :G
Γ ` a :A Γ ` A = B
Γ ` a :B
Γ ` a = b :A Γ ` A = B
Γ ` a = b :B
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The following four rules are admissible in the this type system [AS12], we consider them as
rules of our type system:
Γ ` a :A
Γ ` A
Γ ` a = b :A
Γ ` a :A
Γ, x :F ` G Γ ` a = b :F
Γ ` G[a] = G[b]
Γ, x :F ` t :G Γ ` a = b :F
Γ ` t[a] = t[b] :G[a]
Γ ` A = B
Γ ` A
1.2. Markov’s principle. Markov’s principle can be represented in type theory by the
type
MP := Π(h :N→ N2)[¬¬(Σ(x :N) IsZero (hx))→ Σ(x :N) IsZero (hx)]
where IsZero :N2 → U is defined by IsZero := λy.recN2(λx.U)N1 N0 y.
Note that IsZero (hn) is inhabited when hn = 0 and empty when hn = 1. Thus
Σ(x :N) IsZero (hx) is inhabited if there is n such that hn = 0.
We remark that in the presence of propositional truncation ‖ . ‖, Markov’s principle can
be alternatively formulated with weak (propositional) existential ∃(x :A)B :=‖ Σ(x :A)B ‖.
However, the two formulations are logically equivalent [Uni13, Exercise 3.19].
The main result of this paper is the following:
Theorem 1.1. There is no term t such that MLTT ` t :MP.
An extension of MLTT is given by introducing new objects, judgment forms and
derivation rules. This means in particular that any judgment valid in MLTT is valid in the
extension. A consistent extension is one in which the type N0 is uninhabited.
To show Theorem 1.1 we will form a consistent extension of MLTT with a new constant
` f : N → N2. We will then show that ¬¬(Σ(x : N) IsZero (f x)) is derivable while Σ(x :
N) IsZero (f x) is not derivable. Thus showing that MP is not derivable in this extension and
consequently not derivable in MLTT.
While this is sufficient to establish independence in the sense of non-derivability of MP,
to establish the independence of MP in the stronger sense one also needs to show that ¬MP
is not derivable in MLTT. This can achieved by reference to the work of Aczel [Acz99]
where it is shown that MLTT extended with ` dne :Π(A :U)(¬¬A→ A) is consistent. Since
h :N → N2, x :N ` IsZero (hx) :U we have h :N → N2 ` Σ(x :N) IsZero (hx) :U. If we let
T(h) := Σ(x : N) IsZero (hx) we get that h : N → N2 ` dneT(h) : ¬¬T(h) → T(h). By λ
abstraction we have ` λh.dneT (h) :MP. We can then conclude that there is no term t such
that MLTT ` t :¬MP.
Finally, we will refine the result of Theorem 1.1 by building a consistent extension of
MLTT where ¬MP is derivable.
1.3. Forcing extension. A condition p is a graph of a partial finite function from N to
{0, 1}. We denote by ∅ the empty condition. We write p(n) = b when (n, b) ∈ p. We say
q extends p (written q 6 p) if p is a subset of q. A condition can be thought of as a basic
compact open in Cantor space 2N. Two conditions p and q are compatible if p ∪ q is a
condition and we write pq for p ∪ q. If n /∈ dom(p) we write p(n 7→ 0) for p ∪ {(n, 0)} and
p(n 7→ 1) for p ∪ {(n, 1)}. We define the notion of partition corresponding to the notion of
finite covering of a compact open in Cantor space.
Definition 1.2. We write p C S to say that S is a partition of p and we define it inductively
as follows:
(1) p C {p}.
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(2) If n /∈ dom(p) and p(n 7→ 0) C S0 and p(n 7→ 1) C S1 then p C S0 ∪ S1.
Note that if p C S then any q ∈ S and r ∈ S are incompatible unless q = r. If moreover
s 6 p then s C {sq | q ∈ S compatible with s}.
We extend the given type theory by annotating the judgments with conditions, i.e.
replacing each judgment Γ ` J in the given type system with a judgment Γ `p J .
In addition, we add the locality rule:
Γ `p1 J . . . Γ `pn J
loc p C {p1, . . . , pn}Γ `p J
We add a term f for the generic point along with the introduction and conversion rules:
Γ `p
f-I
Γ `p f :N→ N2
Γ `p
f-eval n ∈ dom(p)
Γ `p f n = p(n) :N2
We add a term w and the rule:
Γ `p
w-term
Γ `p w :¬¬(Σ(x :N) IsZero (f x))
Since w inhabits the type ¬¬(Σ(x :N) IsZero (f x)), our goal is then to show that no term
inhabits the type Σ(x :N) IsZero(f x).
It follows directly from the description of the forcing extension that:
Lemma 1.3. If Γ ` J in standard type theory then Γ `∅ J .
Note that if q 6 p and Γ `p J then Γ `q J (monotonicity). A statement A (represented
as a closed type) is derivable in this extension if `∅ t :A for some t, which implies `p t :A for
all p.
Similarly to [CJ10] we can state a conservativity result for this extension. Let ` g :N→
N2. We say that g is compatible with a condition p if g is such that ` g n = b :N2 whenever
(n, b) ∈ p and ` g n = 0 :N2 otherwise. We write ng for the smallest natural number such
that g ng = 0. Let vg : ¬¬(Σ(x : N) IsZero (g x)) be the term given by vg := λx.x (ng, 0) :
¬¬(Σ(y :N) IsZero (g y)). To see that vg is well typed, note that by design Γ ` g ng = 0 :N2
thus Γ ` IsZero (g ng) = N1 and Γ ` (ng, 0) :Σ(x :N)IsZero (g x). We have then Γ, x :¬(Σ(y :
N) IsZero (g y)) ` x (ng, 0) :N0, thus Γ ` λx.x (ng, 0) :¬¬(Σ(y :N) IsZero (g y)).
Lemma 1.4 (Conservativity). Let ` g :N → N2 be compatible with some condition p. If
Γ `p J then Γ[g/f, vg/w] ` J [g/f, vg/w], i.e. by replacing f with g then w with vg we obtain
a valid judgment in standard type theory. In particular, if we have Γ `∅ J where neither f
nor w occur in Γ or J then Γ ` J is a valid judgment in standard type theory.
Proof. We show that whenever the statement holds for the premise of a typing rule it holds
for the conclusion. The statement will then follow by induction on the derivation tree of
Γ `p J .
For the standard rules the proof is straightforward. For (f-eval) we have (f n)[g/f, vg/w] :=
g n and since g is compatible with p we have Γ[g/f, vg/w] ` g n = p(n) : N2 whenever
n ∈ dom(p). For (w-term) we have
(w :¬¬(Σ(x :N) IsZero (f x)))[g/f, vg/w] := (w :¬¬(Σ(x :N) IsZero (g x)))[vg/w]
:= vg :¬¬(Σ(x :N) IsZero (g x)).
For (loc) the statement follows from the observation that when g is compatible with
p and p C S then g is compatible with exactly one q ∈ S. From Γ `q J by IH we get
Γ[g/f, vg/w] ` J [g/f, vg/w].
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2. A Semantics of the forcing extension
In this section we outline a semantics for the forcing extension given in the previous section.
We will interpret the judgments of type theory by computability predicates and relations
defined by reducibility to computable weak head normal forms.
2.1. Reduction rules. We extend the β, ι conversion with f n_p b whenever (n, b) ∈ p. To
ease the presentation of the proofs and definitions we introduce evaluation contexts following
[WF94].
E ::=[ ] | Eu | E.1 | E.2 | SE | f E
recN0(λx.C)E | recN1(λx.C) aE | recN2(λx.C) a0 a1 E | recN(λx.C) cz g E
An expression E[e] is then the expression resulting from replacing the hole [ ] by e.
We have the following reduction rules:
recN1(λx.C) c 0_ c recN2(λx.C) c0 c1 0_ c0 recN2(λx.C) c0 c1 1_ c1
recN(λx.C) cz g 0_ cz recN(λx.C) cz g (S k)_ g k (recN(λx.C) cz g k)
(λx.t) a_ t[a/x] (u, v).1_ u (u, v).2_ v
e_ e′
e_p e′ k ∈ dom(p)f-red f k _p p(k) e_p e
′
E[e]_p E[e′]
Note that we reduce under S. Also note that the relation _ is monotone, that is if
q 6 p and t _p u then t _q u. In the following we will show that _ is also local, i.e. if
p C S and t_q u for all q ∈ S then t_p u.
Lemma 2.1. If m /∈ dom(p) and t_p(m 7→0) u and t_p(m 7→1) u then t_p u.
Proof. By induction on the derivation of t_p(m 7→0) u. If t_p(m 7→0) u is derived by (f-red)
then t := f k and u := p(m 7→ 0)(k) for some k ∈ dom(p(m 7→ 0)). But since we also have a
reduction f k _p(m 7→1) u, we have p(m 7→ 1)(k) := u := p(m 7→ 0)(k) which could only be
the case if k ∈ dom(p). Thus we have a reduction f k _p u := p(k). If on the other hand
we have a derivation t _ u, then we have t _p u directly. If the derivation t _p(m 7→0) u
has the form E[e]_p(m7→0) E[e′] then we have also E[e]_p(m7→1) E[e′]. Hence, e_p(m7→0) e′
and e_p(m 7→1) e′. By IH e_p e′, thus E[e]_p E[e′].
Lemma 2.2. Let q 6 p. If t _q u then t _p u or t has the form E[fm] for some
m ∈ dom(q) \ dom(p).
Proof. By induction on the derivation of t _q u. If the reduction t _q u has the form
f k _q q(k) then either k /∈ dom(p) and the statement follows or k ∈ dom(p) and we have
t _p u. If on the other hand we have t _ u then t _p u immediately. If t _q u has the
form E[e]_q E[e′] then e_q e′ and the statement follows by induction.
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Corollary 2.3. Let t _p(m 7→0) u and t _p(m 7→1) v for some m /∈ dom(p). If u := v then
t_p u; otherwise, t has the form E[fm].
Define p ` t _ u : A to mean t _p u and `p t = u : A and write p ` A _ B for
p ` A_ B :U.
Note that it holds that if p ` t_ u :Π(x :F )G and ` a :F then p ` t a_ u a :G[a] and
if p ` t_ u :Σ(x :F )G then p ` t.1_ u.1:F and p ` t.2_ u.2:G[t.1].
We define a closure for this relation as follows:
`p t :A
p ` t_∗ t :A p ` t_ u :Ap ` t_∗ u :A p ` t_ u :A p ` u_∗ v :Ap ` t_∗ v :A
`p A
p ` A_∗ A p ` A_ Bp ` A_∗ B p ` A_ B p ` B _∗ Cp ` A_∗ C
A term t is in p-whnf if whenever p ` t_∗ u :A then t := u.
A whnf is canonical if it has one of the forms:
0, 1, n, λx.t, (a, b), f,w,N0,N1,N2,N,U,Π(x :F )G,Σ(x :F )G,
recN0(λx.C), recN1(λx.C) a, recN2(λx.C) a0 a1, recN(λx.C) cz g
A p-whnf is proper if it is canonical or it is of the form E[f k] for k /∈ dom(p).
A canonical p-whnf has no further reduction at any q 6 p. A non-canonical proper
p-whnf, i.e. of the form E[f k] for k /∈ dom(p), have further reduction at some q 6 p, namely
when k ∈ dom(q).
We have the following corollaries to Lemma 2.1 and Corollary 2.3.
Corollary 2.4. Let m /∈ dom(p). Let p(m 7→ 0) ` t _ u :A and p(m 7→ 1) ` t _ v :A. If
u := v then p ` t_ u :A; otherwise t has the form E[fm].
Corollary 2.5. Let p C S and q ` t_ u :A for all q ∈ S. We have p ` t_ u :A.
Proof. By induction on S. If S := {p} the the statement follows. Assume the statement holds
for p(m 7→ 0) C S0 and p(m 7→ 1) C S1 and let S := S0 ∪ S1. By IH, p(m 7→ 0) ` t_ u :A
and p(m 7→ 1) ` t _ u : A. From Lemma 2.1, t _p u. Since `p(m7→0) t = u : A and
`p(m7→1) t = u :A, then `p t = u :A. Thus p ` t_ u :A.
Note that if q 6 p and p ` t_∗ u :A then q ` t_∗ u :A. However if p(m 7→ 0) ` t_∗ u :
A and p(m 7→ 1) ` t_∗ u :A it is not necessarily the case that p ` t_∗ u :A. E.g. we have
that {(m, 0)} ` recN2(λx.N)nn (fm)_∗ n :N and {(m, 1)} ` recN2(λx.N)nn (fm)_∗ n :N
but it is not true that ∅ ` recN2(λx.N)nn (fm)_∗ n :N.
For a closed term `p t :A, we say that t has a p-whnf if p ` t_∗ u :A and u is in p-whnf.
If u is canonical, respectively proper, we say that t has a canonical, respectively proper,
p-whnf.
Since the reduction relation is deterministic we have:
Lemma 2.6. A term `p t :A has at most one p-whnf.
Corollary 2.7. Let `p t :A and m /∈ dom(p). If t has proper p(m 7→ 0)-whnf and a proper
p(m 7→ 1)-whnf then t has a proper p-whnf.
Proof. Let p(m 7→ 0) ` t _∗ u :A and p(m 7→ 1) ` t _∗ v :A with u in proper p(m 7→ 0)-
whnf and v in proper p(m 7→ 1)-whnf. If t := u or t := v then t is already in proper p-whnf.
Alternatively we have reductions p(m 7→ 0) ` t _ u1 :A and p(m 7→ 1) ` t _ v1 :A. By
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Corollary 2.4 either t is in proper p-whnf or u1 := v1 and p ` t_ u1 :A. It then follows by
induction that u1, and thus t, has a proper p-whnf.
2.2. Computability predicate and relation. We define inductively a forcing relation
p  A to express that a type A is computable at p. Mutually by recursion we define relations
p  a :A (a computable of type A at p), p  A = B (A and B are computably equal at
p), and p  a = b :A (a is computably equal to b of type A at p). The definition fits the
generalized mutual induction-recursion schema [Dyb00]4.
The following rules have an implicit (hidden) premise `p A
p ` A_∗ N0
FN0
p  A
p ` A_∗ N1
FN1
p  A
p ` A_∗ N2
FN2
p  A
p ` A_∗ N
FN
p  A FU p  U
p  F
p ` A_∗ Π(x :F )G
∀q 6 p(q  a :F ⇒ q  G[a]) ∀q 6 p(q  a = b :F ⇒ q  G[a] = G[b])
FΠ
p  A
p  F
p ` A_∗ Σ(x :F )G
∀q 6 p(q  a :F ⇒ q  G[a]) ∀q 6 p(q  a = b :F ⇒ q  G[a] = G[b])
FΣ
p  A
p ` A_∗ E[f k] k /∈ dom(p) p(k 7→ 0)  A p(k 7→ 1)  A
FLoc
p  A
(1) Assuming p  A by FN0
(a) Assuming p  B then p  A = B if
(i) p ` B _∗ N0.
(ii) p ` B _∗ E[f k], k /∈ dom(p) and p(k 7→ 0)  A = B and p(k 7→ 1)  A = B.
(b) p 1 t :A for all t.
(c) p 1 t = u :A for all t and u.
(2) Assuming p  A by FN1
(a) Assuming p  B then p  A = B if
(i) p ` B _∗ N1.
(ii) p ` B _∗ E[f k], k /∈ dom(p) and p(k 7→ 0)  A = B and p(k 7→ 1)  A = B.
(b) p  t :A if
(i) p ` t_∗ 0 :A
(ii) p ` t_∗ E[f k] :A, k /∈ dom(p) and p(k 7→ 0)  t :A and p(k 7→ 1)  t :A.
(c) Assuming p  t :A and p  u :A then p  t = u :A if
(i) p ` t_∗ 0 :A and p ` u_∗ 0 :A.
(ii) p ` t _∗ 0 :A and p ` u _∗ E[f k] :A, k /∈ dom(p) and p(k 7→ 0)  t = u :A
and p(k 7→ 1)  t = u :A.
(iii) p ` t_∗ E[f k] :A, k /∈ dom(p) and p(k 7→ 0)  t = u :A and p(k 7→ 1)  t =
u :A.
(3) Assuming p  A by FN2
4However, for the canonical proof below we actually need something weaker than an inductive-recursive
definition (arbitrary fixed-point instead of least fixed-point), reflecting the fact that the universe is defined in
an open way [ML72].
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(a) Assuming p  B then p  A = B if
(i) p ` B _∗ N2.
(ii) p ` B _∗ E[f k], k /∈ dom(p) and p(k 7→ 0)  A = B and p(k 7→ 1)  A = B.
(b) p  t :A if
(i) p ` t_∗ b :A for some b ∈ {0, 1}.
(ii) p ` t_∗ E[f k], k /∈ dom(p) and p(k 7→ 0)  t :A and p(k 7→ 1)  t :A.
(c) Assuming p  t :A and p  u :A then p  t = u :A if
(i) p ` t_∗ b :A and p ` u_∗ b :A for some b ∈ {0, 1}.
(ii) p ` t_∗ b :A, b ∈ {0, 1} and p ` u_∗ E[f k] :A, k /∈ dom(p) and p(k 7→ 0) 
t = u :A and p(k 7→ 1)  t = u :A.
(iii) p ` t_∗ E[f k] :A, k /∈ dom(p) and p(k 7→ 0)  t = u :A and p(k 7→ 1)  t =
u :A.
(4) Assuming p  A by FN
(a) Assuming p  B then p  A = B if
(i) p ` B _∗ N.
(ii) p ` B _∗ E[f k], k /∈ dom(p) and p(k 7→ 0)  A = B and p(k 7→ 1)  A = B.
(b) p  t :A if
(i) p ` t_∗ n :A.
(ii) p ` t_∗ E[f k], k /∈ dom(p) and p(k 7→ 0)  t :A and p(k 7→ 1)  t :A.
(c) Assuming p  t :A and p  u :A then p  t = u :A if
(i) p ` t_∗ n :A and p ` u_∗ n :A.
(ii) p ` t _∗ n :A and p ` u _∗ E[f k] :A, k /∈ dom(p) and p(k 7→ 0)  t = u :A
and p(k 7→ 1)  t = u :A.
(iii) p ` t_∗ E[f k] :A, k /∈ dom(p) and p(k 7→ 0)  t = u :A and p(k 7→ 1)  t =
u :A.
(5) Assuming p  A by FΠ (Let p ` A_∗ Π(x :F )G).
(a) Assuming p  B and `p A = B then p  A = B if
(i) p ` B _∗ Π(x :H)E and p  F = H and ∀q 6 p(q  a :F ⇒ q  G[a] =
E[a]).
(ii) p ` B _∗ E[f k], k /∈ dom(p) and p(k 7→ 0)  A = B and p(k 7→ 1)  A = B.
(b) Assuming `p t :A then p  t :A if
∀q 6 p(q  a :F ⇒ q  t a :G[a]) and ∀q 6 p(q  a = b :F ⇒ q  t a = t b :
G[a]).
(c) Assuming p  t :A and p  u :A and `p t = u :A then p  t = u :A if
∀q 6 p(q  a :F ⇒ q  t a = u a :G[a])
(6) Assuming p  A by FΣ (Let p ` A_∗ Σ(x :F )G).
(a) Assuming p  B and `p A = B then p  A = B if
(i) p ` B _∗ Σ(x :H)E and p  F = H and ∀q 6 p(q  a :F ⇒ q  G[a] =
E[a]).
(ii) p ` B _∗ E[f k], k /∈ dom(p) and p(k 7→ 0)  A = B and p(k 7→ 1)  A = B.
(b) Assuming `p t :A then p  t :A if
p  t.1:F and p  t.2:G[t.1]
(c) Assuming p  t :A and p  u :A and `p t = u :A then p  t = u :A if
p  t.1 = u.1:F and p  t.2 = u.2:G[t.1]
(7) Assuming p  A by FU (i.e. A := U).
(a) Assuming p  B then p  A = B if B := U
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(b) Assuming `p L :A then p  L :A if
(i) p ` L_∗ M with M ∈ {N0,N1,N2,N}
(ii) p ` L_∗ Π(x :F )G and p  F :A and
∀q 6 p(q  a :F ⇒ q  G[a] :A) and ∀q 6 p(q  a = b :F ⇒ q  G[a] = G[b] :
A).
(iii) p ` L_∗ Σ(x :F )G and p  F :A and
∀q 6 p(q  a :F ⇒ q  G[a] :A) and ∀q 6 p(q  a = b :F ⇒ q  G[a] = G[b] :
A)
(iv) p ` L_∗ E[f k], k /∈ dom(p) and p(k 7→ 0)  L :A and p(k 7→ 1)  L :A.
(c) Assuming p  L :A and p  P :A and `p L = P :A then p  L = P :A if
(i) p ` L_∗ M and p ` P _∗ M for M ∈ {N0,N1,N2,N}.
(ii) p ` L_∗ Π(x :F )G and p ` P _∗ Π(x :H)E and
p  F = H :A and ∀q 6 p(q  a :F ⇒ q  G[a] = E[a] :A)
(iii) p ` L_∗ Σ(x :F )G and p ` P _∗ Σ(x :H)E and
p  F = H :A and ∀q 6 p(q  a :F ⇒ q  G[a] = E[a] :A)
(iv) p ` L _∗ M with M in canonical p-whnf and p ` P _∗ E[f k], k /∈ dom(p)
and p(k 7→ 0)  L = P :A and (k 7→ 1)  L = P :A.
(v) p ` L _∗ E[f k], k /∈ dom(p) and p(k 7→ 0)  L = P :A and (k 7→ 1)  L =
P :A.
(8) Assuming p  A by FLoc (i.e. p ` A _∗ E[f k], k /∈ dom(p) and p(k 7→ 0)  A and
p(k 7→ 1)  A).
(a) Assuming p  B and `p A = B then p  A = B if p(k 7→ 0)  A = B and
p(k 7→ 1)  A = B.
(b) Assuming `p t :A then p  t :A if p(k 7→ 0)  t :A and p(k 7→ 1)  t :A.
(c) Assuming p  t : A and p  u : A and `p t = u : A then p  t = u : A if
p(k 7→ 0)  t = u :A and p(k 7→ 1)  t = u :A.
Note from the definition that when p  A = B then p  A and p  B, when p  a :A
then p  A and when p  a = b :A then p  a :A and p  b :A. It follows also from the
definition that `p J whenever p  J .
The clause (FLoc) gives semantics to variable types. For example, if p := {(0, 0)}
and q := {(0, 1)} the type R := recN2(λx.U)N1 N (f 0) has reductions p ` R _∗ N1 and
q ` R_∗ N. Thus p  R and q  R and since ∅ C {p, q} we have ∅  R.
Lemma 2.8. If p  A then there is a partition p C S where A has a canonical q-whnf for all
q ∈ S. If p  A = B then there is a partition p C S where A and B have similar canonical q-
whnf for all q ∈ S, i.e. q ` A_∗ A′ and q ` B _∗ B′ where (A′, B′) is of the form (N0,N0),
(N1,N1), (N2,N2), (N,N), (U,U), (Π(x :F )G,Π(x :H)E), or (Σ(x :F )G,Σ(x :H)E).
Proof. The statement follows from the definition by induction on the derivation of p  A
Corollary 2.9. Let p C S. If q  A for all q ∈ S then A has a proper p-whnf.
Proof. Follows from Lemma 2.8 and Corollary 2.7 by induction.
Lemma 2.10. Let p ` A_∗ M with M ∈ {N1,N2,N}. If p  t :A then there is a partition
p C S where t has a canonical q-whnf for all q ∈ S. If p  t = u :A then there is a partition
p C S where t and u have the same canonical q-whnf for each q ∈ S.
Proof. Follows from the definition.
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The rest of this section is dedicated to proving the following theorem:
Theorem 2.11. The following hold for the forcing relation
(1) Monotonicity: If q 6 p and p  J then q  J .
(2) Locality: If p C S and q  J for all q ∈ S then p  J .
(3) Reflexivity: If p  A then p  A = A and if p  a :A then p  a = a :A.
(4) Symmetry: If p  A = B then p  B = A and if p  a = b :A then p  b = a :A.
(5) Transitivity: If p  A = B and p  B = C then p  A = C and if p  a = b :A and
p  b = c :A then p  a = c :A.
(6) Extensionality: If p  A = B then if p  a :A then p  a :B and if p  a = b :A then
p  a = b :B.
In the premise of any forcing p  J there are a number of typing judgments. Since the
type system satisfy the properties listed in Theorem 2.11 we will largely ignore these typing
judgments in the proofs.
Lemma 2.12. If p  A and q 6 p then q  A.
Proof. Let p  A and q 6 p. By induction on the derivation of p  A
(1) (Derivation by N) Let p ` A_∗ N. Since the reduction is monotone q ` A_∗ N, thus
q  A.
The statement follows similarly when p  A holds by FN0 , FN1 , FN2 , FN or FU.
(2) (Derivation by FΠ.) Let p ` A _∗ Π(x : F )G. From the premise p  F , by IH, it
follows that q  F . From ∀r 6 p(r  a : F ⇒ r  G[a]) and ∀r 6 p(r  a = b :
F ⇒ r  G[a] = G[b]) it follows directly that ∀s 6 q(s  a : F ⇒ s  G[a]) and
∀s 6 q(s  a = b :F ⇒ s  G[a] = G[b]). Hence q  A.
The statement follows similarly when p  A holds by FΣ
(3) (Derivation by FLoc.) Let p ` A _∗ E[fm],m /∈ dom(p). If m ∈ dom(q) then q 6
p(m 7→ b) for some b ∈ {0, 1}. Since p(m 7→ b)  A with a derivation strictly smaller
than the derivation of p  A then by IH q  A. Alternatively, q ` A_∗ E[fm] but then
q(m 7→ b) 6 p(m 7→ b). By IH we have q(m 7→ 0)  A and q(m 7→ 1)  A and thus
q  A.
Lemma 2.13. If p  A = B and q 6 p then q  A = B.
Proof. Let p  A = B and q 6 p. We have then that p  A and p  B. By Lemma 2.12 we
have that q  A and q  B. By induction on the derivation of p  A
(1) Let p  A by FLoc, i.e. p ` A _∗ E[f k], k /∈ dom(p) and p(k 7→ 0)  A = B and
p(k 7→ 1)  A = B. By induction on the derivation of p  A = B. If k ∈ dom(q)
then q 6 p(k 7→ b) for some b ∈ {0, 1}. Since the derivation of p(k 7→ b)  A = B is
strictly smaller than that of p  A = B, by IH q  A = B. Otherwise, k /∈ dom(q)
and q ` A _∗ E[f k] and since q(k 7→ b) 6 p(k 7→ b), by IH, q(k 7→ 0)  A = B and
q(k 7→ 1)  A = B. By the definition q  A = B.
(2) Let p  A by FN (i.e. p ` A_∗ N). By induction on the derivation of p  A = B
(a) Let p ` B _∗ N. We have directly that q  A = B by monotonicity of the
reduction.
(b) Let p ` B _∗ E[f k], k /∈ dom(p) and p(k 7→ 0)  A = B and p(k 7→ 1)  A = B.
The statement then follows similarly to (1).
The statement follows similarly when p  A holds by FN0 ,FN1 ,FN2 .
(3) Let p ` A_∗ Π(x :F )G. By induction on the derivation of p  A = B
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(a) Let p ` B _∗ Π(x :HE) and p  F = H and ∀r 6 p(r  a :F ⇒ r  G[a] = E[a]).
By IH q  F = H. Directly we have ∀s 6 q(s  a :F ⇒ s  G[a] = E[a]). Thus
q  A = B.
(b) Let p ` B _∗ E[f k], k /∈ dom(p) and p(k 7→ 0)  A = B and p(k 7→ 1)  A = B.
The statement then follows similarly to (1).
The statement follows similarly when p  A holds by FΣ.
(4) (Derivation by FU) We have then that B := U and thus q  A = B.
Lemma 2.14. If p  t :A and q 6 p then q  t :A.
Proof. Let p  t :A and q 6 p. From the definition we have that p  A. From Lemma 2.12
we have that q  A. By induction on the derivation of p  A.
(1) Let p  A by FN. By induction on the derivation of p  t :A.
(a) Let p ` t_∗ n :A. Then q ` t_∗ n :A and q  t :A.
(b) Let p ` t _∗ E[f k] : A, k /∈ dom(p) and p(k 7→ 0)  t : A and p(k 7→ 1)  t : A.
If k ∈ dom(q) then q 6 p(k 7→ b) for some b ∈ {0, 1}, since the derivation of
p(k 7→ b)  t :A is strictly smaller than the derivation p  t :A, by IH, q  t :A.
Otherwise, k /∈ dom(q) and q ` t_∗ E[f k] :A. But q(k 7→ b) 6 p(k 7→ b) and by IH
q(k 7→ 0)  t :A and q(k 7→ 1)  t :A. By the definition q  t :A.
The statement follows similarly when p  A is derived by FN1 or FN2 .
(2) Let p  A by FU. The statement follows similarly to Lemma 2.12.
(3) Let p  A by FΠ and let p ` A _∗ Π(x :F )G. From ∀r 6 p(r  a :F ⇒ r  t a :G[a])
and ∀r 6 p(r  a = b :F ⇒ r  t a = t b :G[a]) we have directly that ∀s 6 q(s  a :F ⇒
s  t a :G[a]) and ∀s 6 q(s  a = b :F ⇒ s  t a = t b :G[a]). Thus q  t :A.
(4) Let p  A by FΣ and let p ` A_∗ Σ(x :F )G. By induction on the derivation of p  t :A.
From p  t.1:F and p  t.2:G[t.1], by IH, q  t.1:F and q  t.2:G[t.1], thus q  t :A.
(5) Let p  A by FLoc and let p ` A _∗ E[f k], k /∈ dom(p) and p(k 7→ 0)  A and
p(k 7→ 1)  A. By induction on the derivation of p  t : A. If k ∈ dom(q) then
q 6 p(k 7→ b) for some b ∈ {0, 1} from the premise p(k 7→ 0)  t :A and p(k 7→ 1)  t :A,
by IH, q  t :A. Otherwise, k /∈ dom(q) and q ` A_∗ E[f k] (i.e. q  A by FLoc). Since
q(k 7→ b) 6 p(k 7→ b), by the IH, q(k 7→ 0)  t :A and q(k 7→ 1)  t :A. By the definition
q  t :A.
Lemma 2.15. If p  t = u :A and q 6 p then q  t = u :A.
Proof. Let p  t = u :A and q 6 p. We have then that p  A, p  t :A, and p  u :A. By
Lemma 2.12 q  A. By Lemma 2.14 q  t :A and q  u :A. By induction on the derivation
p  A.
(1) Let p  A by FN. By induction on the derivation of p  t = u :A.
(a) Let p ` t_∗ n :A and p ` u_∗ n :A. By monotonicity of reduction q  t = u :A.
(b) Let p ` t_∗ n :A and p ` t_∗ E[f k] :A, k /∈ dom(p) and p(k 7→ 0)  t = u :A and
p(k 7→ 1)  t = u :A. If k ∈ dom(q) then q 6 p(k 7→ b) for some b ∈ {0, 1}, by IH,
q  t = u :A. Otherwise, q ` t_∗ E[f k] :A. But q(k 7→ b) 6 p(k 7→ b) and by IH
q(k 7→ 0)  t = u :A and q(k 7→ 1)  t = u :A. By the definition q  t = u :A.
(c) Let p ` t_∗ E[f k] :A, k /∈ dom(p). The statement follows similarly to (1b).
The statement follows similarly for when p  A holds by FN1 or FN2 .
(2) Let p  A by FU. The statement follows by a proof similar to that of Lemma 2.13.
(3) Let p  A by FΠ and let p ` A _∗ Π(x :F )G. From ∀r 6 q(r  a :F ⇒ r  t a = u a :
G[a]) we have directly that ∀s 6 q(s  a :F ⇒ s  t a = u a :G[a]). Hence q  t = u :A.
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(4) Let p  A by FΣ and let p ` A _∗ Σ(x : F )G. By induction on the derivation of
p  t = u : A. From p  t.1 = u.1 : F and p  t.2 = u.2 : G[t.1], by IH we have
q  t.1 = u.1:F and q  t.2 = u.2:G[t.1], thus q  t = u :A.
(5) Let p  A by FLoc and let p ` A_∗ E[f k], k /∈ dom(p). By induction on the derivation
of p  t = u : A. If k ∈ dom(q) then the statement follows by IH. If k /∈ dom(q)
then q ` A _∗ E[f k] (i.e. q  A by FLoc) and since q(k 7→ b) 6 p(k 7→ b), by IH,
q(k 7→ 0)  t = u :A and q(k 7→ 1)  t = u :A. Hence q  t = u :A.
We collect the results of Lemmas 2.12, 2.14, 2.15, and 2.13 in the following corollary.
Corollary 2.16 (Monotonicity). If p  J and q 6 p then q  J .
We write  J when ∅  J . By monotonicity  J iff p  J for all p.
Lemma 2.17. Let p  A and p  B. If p(m 7→ 0)  A = B and p(m 7→ 1)  A = B then
p  A = B.
Proof. By induction on the derivation of p  A.
(1) Let p  A by FN. By induction on the derivation of p  B
(a) If p  B by FN then p  A = B immediately.
(b) If p  B by FLoc. The statement follows similarly to (4) below.
The statement follows similarly when p  A is derived by FN0 ,FN1 and FN2 .
(2) Let p  A by FΠ and let p ` A_∗ Π(x :F )G. By induction on the derivation of p  B
(a) Let p  B by FΠ and let p ` B _∗ Π(x :H)E. Since p  A and p  B we have
p  F and p  H. From the premise p(m 7→ 0)  F = H and p(m 7→ 1)  F = H
and by IH p  F = H.
Let q 6 p and q  a :F . If q 6 p(m 7→ b) for some b ∈ {0, 1} then q  G[a] = E[a].
Otherwise, since q(m 7→ b) 6 p(m 7→ b), by monotonicity q(m 7→ 0)  G[a] = E[a]
and q(m 7→ 1)  G[a] = E[a]. From p  A we have that q  G[a] and from p  B
we have that q  E[a]. By IH q  G[a] = E[a]. We thus have p  A = B.
(b) Let p  B by FLoc. The statement then follows similarly to (4) below.
The statement follows similarly when p  A is derived by FΣ.
(3) If p  A by FU then A := B := U and p  A = B.
(4) If p  A by FLoc. Let p ` A_∗ E[f k], k /∈ dom(p) and p(k 7→ 0)  A and p(k 7→ 1)  A.
(a) If k = m then we have p  A = B by the definition.
(b) If k 6= m. By monotonicity p(k 7→ b)  A and p(k 7→ b)  B and p(k 7→ b)(m 7→
0)  A = B and p(k 7→ b)(m 7→ 1)  A = B for all b ∈ {0, 1}. The derivation
of p(k 7→ b)  A is strictly smaller than the derivation of p  A. By IH we have
p(k 7→ 0)  A = B and p(k 7→ 1)  A = B. By the definition p  A = B.
Lemma 2.18. If p(m 7→ 0)  A and p(m 7→ 1)  A for some m /∈ dom(p) then p  A.
Proof. The proof is by by induction on the derivations p(m 7→ 0)  A. Note that from
p(m 7→ 0)  A and p(m 7→ 1)  A we have that A has proper p(m 7→ 0)-whnf and
p(m 7→ 1)-whnf and by Corollary 2.9 A has a proper p-whnf.
(1) Let p(m 7→ 0)  A by FN
(a) If A has a canonical p-whnf then p ` A_∗ N and p  A.
(b) Otherwise, p ` A_∗ E[k], k /∈ dom(p). Since A has a canonical p(m 7→ 0)-whnf we
have that k = m and by the definition we have p  A by FLoc
The statement follows similarly when p(m 7→ 0)  A holds by FN0 , FN1 or FN2 .
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(2) Let p(m 7→ 0)  A by FΠ
(a) If A has a canonical p-whnf then p ` A _∗ Π(x :F )G. From p(m 7→ 0)  A and
p(m 7→ 1)  A we have p(m 7→ 0)  F and p(m 7→ 1)  F . By IH p  F . Let q 6 p
(i) If m ∈ dom(q) then q 6 p(m 7→ b) for some b ∈ {0, 1}, then (q  a :F ⇒ q 
G[a]) and (q  a = b :F ⇒ q  G[a] = G[b]).
(ii) If m /∈ dom(q) then q C {q(m 7→ 0), q(m 7→ 1)}. Let q  a :F , by monotonic-
ity q(m 7→ 0)  a :F and q(m 7→ 1)  a :F . Since q(m 7→ b) 6 p(m 7→ b), by
the definition q(m 7→ 0)  G[a] and q(m 7→ 1)  G[a] and by IH q  G[a].
Let q  a = b : F , by monotonicity q(m 7→ 0)  a = b : F and q(m 7→
1)  a = b : F . But then q(m 7→ 0)  G[a] and q(m 7→ 1)  G[a] and
q(m 7→ 0)  G[b] and q(m 7→ 1)  G[b] and q(m 7→ 0)  G[a] = G[b] and
q(m 7→ 1)  G[a] = G[b]. By Lemma 2.17 we have q  G[a] = G[b].
The statement follows similarly when p(m 7→ 0)  A holds by FΣ.
(3) Let p(m 7→ 0)  A by FU then A := U and p  A.
(4) Let p(m 7→ 0)  A by FLoc. Since A doesn’t have a canonical p(m 7→ 0)-whnf A doesn’t
have a canonical p-whnf. Since A has a proper p-whnf we have p ` A _∗ E[f k], k /∈
dom(p).
(a) If k = m then by the definition we have p  A by FLoc
(b) If k 6= m then p(m 7→ b) ` A _∗ E[f k]. Hence p(m 7→ 1)  A by FLoc. We have
then p(m 7→ 0)(k 7→ 0)  A and p(m 7→ 0)(k 7→ 1)  A and p(m 7→ 1)(k 7→ 0)  A
and p(m 7→ 1)(k 7→ 1)  A. By IH p(k 7→ 0)  A and p(k 7→ 1)  A. By the
definition p  A.
Lemma 2.19. If p(m 7→ 0)  A = B and p(m 7→ 1)  A = B for m /∈ dom(p) then
p  A = B.
Proof. By the definition p(m 7→ 0)  A and p(m 7→ 1)  A and p(m 7→ 0)  B and
p(m 7→ 1)  B. By Lemma 2.18 p  A and p  B. By Lemma 2.17 p  A = B.
Lemma 2.20.
(1) If p(m 7→ 0)  t :A and p(m 7→ 1)  t :A for some m /∈ dom(p) then p  t :A.
(2) If p(m 7→ 0)  t = u : A and p(m 7→ 1)  t = u : A for some m /∈ dom(p) then
p  t = u :A.
Proof. We prove the two statements mutually by induction.
(1) From p(m 7→ 0)  t :A and p(m 7→ 1)  t :A we have p(m 7→ 0)  A and p(m 7→ 1)  A
and by Lemma 2.18 p  A. By induction on the derivation of p  A.
(a) Let p  A by FN. Since t has proper p(m 7→ 0)-whnf and p(m 7→ 1)-whnf. By
Lemma 2.7 t has a proper p-whnf. By induction on the derivation of p(m 7→ 0)  t :
A.
(i) Let p(m 7→ 0) ` t_∗ n :A
(A) If t has a canonical p-whnf then p ` t_∗ n :A and p  t :A directly.
(B) Otherwise, p ` t_∗ E[f k] :A, k /∈ dom(p). But then we have that k = m
and by the definition p  t :A.
(ii) Let p(m 7→ 0) ` t_∗ E[f k], k /∈ dom(p(m 7→ 0)) and p(m 7→ 0)(k 7→ 0)  t :
A and p(m 7→ 0)(k 7→ 1)  t :A. By monotonicity p(m 7→ 1)(k 7→ 0)  t :A
and p(m 7→ 1)(k 7→ 1)  t :A. By IH p(k 7→ 0)  t :A and p(k 7→ 1)  t :A
and by the definition p  t :A.
The statement follows similarly when p  A by FN1 and FN2 .
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(b) Let p  A by FΠ and p ` A _∗ Π(x :F )G. Let q 6 p. If q 6 p(m 7→ b) then we
have directly q  a : F ⇒ q  t a :G[a] and q  a = b : F ⇒ q  t a = t b :G[a].
Otherwise, we have q(m 7→ b) 6 p(m 7→ b). Let q  a : F . By monotonicity
q(m 7→ 0)  a : F and q(m 7→ 1)  a : F and we have q(m 7→ 0)  t a : G[a]
and q(m 7→ 1)  t a : G[a]. By IH we have q  t a : G[a]. Let q  a = b : F .
By monotonicity q(m 7→ 0)  a = b : F and q(m 7→ 1)  a = b : F and we
have q(m 7→ 0)  t a = t b : G[a] and q(m 7→ 1)  t a = t b : G[a]. By IH (2)
q  t a = t b :G[a]. Thus we have p  t :A.
(c) Let p  A by FΣ and let p ` A _∗ Σ(x :F )G. We have p(m 7→ 0)  t.1 :F and
p(m 7→ 1)  t.1 :F and p(m 7→ 0)  t.2 :G[t.1] and p(m 7→ 1)  t.2 :G[t.1]. By IH
p  t.1:F and p  t.2:G[t.1]. Thus p  t :A.
(d) Let p  A by FU. The statement then follows similarly to Lemma 2.18.
(e) Let p  A by FLoc and let p ` A _∗ E[f k], k /∈ dom(p). If k = m then by the
definition p  t :A. If k 6= m then by monotonicity p(k 7→ 0)(m 7→ 0)  t :A and
p(k 7→ 0)(m 7→ 1)  t :A and p(k 7→ 1)(m 7→ 0)  t :A and p(k 7→ 1)(m 7→ 1)  t :A.
By IH p(k 7→ 0)  t :A and p(k 7→ 1)  t :A. By the definition p  t :A.
(2) From p(m 7→ 0)  t = u :A and p(m 7→ 0)  t = u :A we have p(m 7→ 0)  t :A and
p(m 7→ 1)  t :A and p(m 7→ 0)  u :A and p(m 7→ 1)  u :A and p(m 7→ 0)  A and
p(m 7→ 1)  A. By Lemma 2.18 p  A. By induction on the derivation of p  A.
(a) Let p  A by FN. By (1a) we have p  t :A. By induction on the derivation of
p  t :A.
(i) If p ` t_∗ n :A. By induction on the derivation of p  u :A
(A) If u has a canonical p-whnf then p ` u_∗ n :A and p  t = u :A.
(B) Otherwise, p  u _∗ E[f k] : A, k /∈ dom(p). If k = m then by the
definition p  t = u : A. If k 6= m then by monotonicity p(k 7→
0)(m 7→ 0)  t = u : A and p(k 7→ 0)(m 7→ 1)  t = u : A and
p(k 7→ 1)(m 7→ 0)  t = u :A and p(k 7→ 1)(m 7→ 1)  t = u :A. By
IH, p(k 7→ 0)  t = u :A and p(k 7→ 1)  t = u :A. By the definition
p  t = u :A.
(ii) If p ` t _∗ E[f k] :A, k /∈ dom(p) and p(k 7→ 0)  t :A and p(k 7→ 1)  t :A.
The statement follows similarly to (2(a)iB).
The statement follows similarly when p  A holds by FN1 and FN2 .
(b) Let p  A by FΠ and p ` A _∗ Π(x : F )G. By (1b) we have p  t : A and
p  u : A. Let q 6 p. If q 6 p(m 7→ b) for some b ∈ {0, 1} then we have
q  a :F ⇒ q  t a = u a :G[a]. Otherwise, we have q(m 7→ b) 6 p(m 7→ b). Let
q  a :F . By monotonicity q(m 7→ 0)  a :F and q(m 7→ 1)  a :F and we have
q(m 7→ 0)  t a = u a : G[a] and q(m 7→ 1)  t a = u a : G[a]. By IH we have
q  t a = u a :G[a]. Thus p  t = u :A.
(c) Let p  A by FΣ and let p ` A_∗ Σ(x :F )G. By (2c) p  t :A and p  u :A. We
have p(m 7→ 0)  t.1 = u.1:F and p(m 7→ 1)  t.1 = u.1:F and p(m 7→ 0)  t.2 =
u.2:G[t.1] and p(m 7→ 1)  t.2 = u.2:G[t.1]. By IH p  t.1 = u.1:F . Since we have
p(m 7→ 0)  u.2 :G[t.1] and p(m 7→ 1)  u.2 :G[t.1] then by IH(1) p  u.2 :G[t.1].
By IH we have p  t.2 = u.2:G[t.1]. Thus we have p  t = u :A.
(d) Let p  A by FU. The statement then follows similarly to Lemma 2.19.
(e) Let p  A by FLoc and let p ` A _∗ E[f k], k /∈ dom(p). By (1e) p  t :A and
p  u : A. If k = m then by the definition p  t = u : A. If k 6= m then by
monotonicity p(k 7→ 0)(m 7→ 0)  t = u :A and p(k 7→ 0)(m 7→ 1)  t = u :A
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and p(k 7→ 1)(m 7→ 0)  t = u : A and p(k 7→ 1)(m 7→ 1)  t = u : A. By IH
p(k 7→ 0)  t = u :A and p(k 7→ 1)  t = u :A. By the definition p  t = u :A.
Corollary 2.21 (Locality). If p C S and q  J for all q ∈ S then p  J .
Proof. Follows from Lemma 2.18, Lemma 2.20, and Lemma 2.19 by induction.
Lemma 2.22. Let p  A = B.
(a) If p  t :A then p  t :B and if p  u :B then p  u :A.
(b) If p  t = u :A then p  t = u :B and if p  v = w :B then p  v = w :A.
Proof. By induction on the derivations of p  A, p  B and p  A = B
(1) Let p ` A_∗ N and p ` B _∗ N
(a) Let p  t :A. By Lemma 2.10 there is a partition p C S where for each q ∈ S
q ` t _∗ n :A for some n ∈ N. But then q ` t _∗ n :B and q  t :B. By locality
p  t :B. Similarly if p  u :B then p  u :A.
(b) Let p  t = u :A then there is a partition p C S where for each q ∈ S q ` t_∗ n :A
and q ` u _∗ n :A for some n ∈ N. But then q ` t _∗ n :B and q ` u _∗ n :B
and q  t = u :B. By locality p  t = u :B. Similarly p  v = w :A whenever
p  v = w :B
(2) Let p ` A_∗ Π(x :F )G and p ` B _∗ Π(x :H)E.
(a) Let p  t :A and q 6 p. Let q  a :H. From p  A = B we get p  F = H and
by monotonicity q  F = H. By IH q  a :F . Thus we have q  t a :G[a]. Since
q  G[a] = E[a], by IH q  t a :E[a]. Similarly if q  a = b :H by monotonicity
q  a = b : H and by IH q  a = b : F . Thus q  t a = t b : G[a] and since
q  G[a] = E[a]. By IH q  t a = t b :E[a]. Similarly p  u :A when p  u :B.
(b) Let p  t = u : A and q 6 p. Let q  a : H. Similarly to the above we get
q  t a = u a :E[a]. Thus showing q  t = u :B. Similarly we have q  v = w :A
when q  v = w :B
(3) Let p ` A_∗ Σ(x :F )G and p ` B _∗ Σ(x :H)E.
(a) Let p  t :A. We have p  t.1 : F and p  t.2 :G[t.1]. From p  A = B we get
p  F = H and by IH p  t.1:H. From p  A = B we get p  G[t.1] = E[t.1] and
by IH p  t.2:E[t.1]. Thus p  t :B. Similarly we have p  u :A when p  u :B.
(b) Let p  t = u : A. We have p  t.1 = u.1 : F and p  t.2 = u.2 :G[t.1]. From
p  A = B we get p  F = H and by IH p  t.1 = u.1:H. From p  A = B we get
p  G[t.1] = E[t.1] and by IH p  t.2 = u.2 :E[t.1]. Thus p  t = u :B. Similarly
we have p  v = w :A when p  v = w :B.
(4) If either A or B does not reduce to a canonical p-whnf then by Lemma 2.8 we have a
partition p C S where for each q ∈ S both A and B have canonical whnf and we can
show the statement for each q ∈ S by the above. By locality the statement follows
for p.
Immediately from the definition we have
Lemma 2.23. If p  A then p  A = A.
Lemma 2.24. If p  A = B then p  B = A.
Proof. If both A and B have canonical p-whnf then the statement follows by induction from
the definition and Lemma 2.22. Otherwise, by Lemma 2.8 we have a partition p C S where
both A and B have canonical q-whnf for all q ∈ S. By monotonicity q  A = B and it
follows by the above that q  B = A. By locality p  B = A.
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Lemma 2.25. If p  A = B and p  B = C then p  A = C.
Proof. Let p  A = B and p  B = C. We then have that p  A, p  B and p  C.
Thus A, B and C have proper p-whnf. If any of these proper p-wnf is not canonical then
by Lemma 2.8 we can find a partition p C S where all three have canonical q-whnf for all
q ∈ S. By monotonicity q  A = B and q  B = C for all q ∈ S. If we can then show that
q  A = C for all q ∈ S then by locality we will have p  A = C. Thus we can assume
w.l.o.g that A, B and C have canonical p-whnf.
By induction on the derivations of p  A,
(1) Let p  A by FN. Since by assumption B has a canonical p-wnf and p  A = B then
p ` B _∗ N. Similarly p ` C _∗ N and we have p  A = C
The statement follows similarly when p  A holds by FN0 , FN1 and FN2 .
(2) Let p  A by FΠ and p ` A _∗ Π(x : F )G. From p  A = B and since by
assumption B has a canonical p-whnf we have p ` B _∗ Π(x :H)E and p  F = H
and ∀q 6 p(q  a : F ⇒ q  G[a] = E[a]). Since p  B = C and by assumption
C has a canonical p-whnf we have p ` C _∗ Π(x : T )R and p  H = T and
∀q 6 p(q  b :H ⇒ q  E[b] = R[b]).
By IH p  F = T . Let q 6 p and q  a : F . By monotonicity q  F = H and
by Lemma 2.22 q  a : H. Thus q  E[a] = R[a]. But q  G[a] = E[a]. By IH
q  G[a] = R[a]. Thus we have p  A = C.
The statement follows similarly when p  A holds by FΣ.
(FU) Since p  A = B and p  B = C, we have B := U and C := U and the statements
follows.
Immediately from the definition we have the following
Lemma 2.26. If p  t :A then p  t = t :A.
Lemma 2.27. If p  t = u :A and then p  u = t :A.
Proof. Let p  t = u :A. We have p  t :A, p  u :A and p  A. By induction on the
derivation of p  A.
(1) Let p  A by FN. Since p  t = u :A we have a partition (Lemma 2.10) p C S where
for each q ∈ S we have q ` t _∗ n : A and q ` u _∗ n : A for some n ∈ N. Hence
q  u = t :A for all q ∈ S. By locality p  t = u :A.
The statement follows similarly when p  A is derived by FN1 and FN2 .
(2) Let p  A by FΠ and let p ` A _∗ Π(x :F )G. Let q 6 p and q  a :F we then have
q  t a = u a :G[a]. We have q  G[a] and by IH q  u a = t a :G[a]. Thus p  u = t :A.
(3) Let p  A by FΣ and let p ` A _∗ Σ(x : F )G. We have p  t.1 = u.1 : F and
p  t.2 = u.2 : G[t.1]. Since q  F , by IH p  u.1 = t.1 : F . Since p  A we have
p  G[t.1] = G[u.1]. By Lemma 2.22 p  t.2 = u.2 :G[u.1]. Since p  G[u.1], by IH
p  u.2 = t.2:G[u.1]. Thus p  u = t :A.
(4) Let p  A by FU. The statement then follows similarly to Lemma 2.25
(5) Let p  A by FLoc and let p ` A _∗ E[f k], k /∈ dom(p) and p(k 7→ 0)  A and
p(k 7→ 1)  A. Since p  t = u : A we have that p(k 7→ 0)  t = u : A and
p(k 7→ 1)  t = u :A. By IH p(k 7→ 0)  u = t :A and p(k 7→ 1)  u = t :A. By the
definition p  u = t :A.
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Lemma 2.28. If p  t = u :A and p  u = v :A then p  t = v :A.
Proof. Let p  t = u :A and p  u = v :A. We have p  A, p  t :A, p  u :A and p  v :A.
By induction on the derivation of p  A.
(1) Let p  A by FN. By Lemma 2.10 there is a partition p C S where for each q ∈ S we
have q ` t_∗ n :A, q ` u_∗ n :A, and q ` v _∗ n :A. Thus q  t = v :A for all q ∈ S.
By locality q  t = v :A.
The statement follows similarly when p  A by FN1 and FN2
(2) Let p  A by FΠ and let p ` A_∗ Π(x :F )G. Let q 6 p and q  a :F . We have then
q  t a = u a :G[a] and q  u a = v a :G[a]. By IH q  t a = v a :G[a]. Thus p  t = v :A.
(3) Let p  A by FΣ and let p ` A _∗ Σ(x : F )G. Since p  t = u : A we have that
p  t.1 = u.1:F and p  t.2 = u.2:G[t.1]. Similarly we have that p  u.1 = v.1:F and
p  u.2 = v.2:G[u.1]. Since p  A we have that p  G[t.1] = G[u.1] and by Lemma 2.22
p  u.2 = v.2:G[t.1]. By IH we have p  t.1 = v.1:F and p  t.2 = v.2:G[t.1]. We have
then that p  t = v :A.
(4) Let p  A by FU. The statement then follows similarly to Lemma 2.25.
(5) Let p  A by FLoc and let p ` A _∗ E[f k], k /∈ dom(p) and p(k 7→ 0)  A and
p(k 7→ 1)  A. We have that p(k 7→ 0)  t = u : A and p(k 7→ 1)  t = u : A and
p(k 7→ 0)  u = v : A and p(k 7→ 1)  u = v : A. By IH p(k 7→ 0)  t = v : A and
p(k 7→ 1)  t = v :A. By the definition p  t = v :A.
Theorem 2.11 then follows from the above.
3. Soundness
In this section we show that the type theory described in Section 1 is sound with respect to
the semantics described in Section 2. I.e. we aim to show that p  J whenever `p J .
Lemma 3.1. If p ` A_∗ B and p  B then p  A and p  A = B.
Proof. Follows from the definition by induction on the derivation of p  B.
Lemma 3.2. Let p  A. If p ` t_ u :A and p  u :A then p  t :A and p  t = u :A.
Proof. Let p ` t_ u :A and p  u :A. By induction on the derivation of p  A.
(1) Let p  A by FU. The statement follows similarly to Lemma 3.1.
(2) Let p  A by FN. By induction on the derivation of p  u :A. If p ` u_∗ n :N then p `
t_∗ n :N and the statement follows by the definition. If p ` u_∗ E[f k] :A, k /∈ dom(p)
and p(k 7→ 0)  u :A and p(k 7→ 1)  u :A then since p(k 7→ b) ` t _ u :A, by IH
p(k 7→ 0)  t :A and p(k 7→ 1)  t :A and p(k 7→ 0)  t = u :A and p(k 7→ 1)  t = u :A.
By the definition p  t :A and p  t = u :A.
The statement follows similarly for FN1 and FN2 .
(3) Let p  A by FΠ and let p ` A _∗ Π(x : F )G. Let q 6 p and q  a : F . We have
q ` t a _ u a : G[a]. By IH q  t a : G[a] and q  t a = u a : G[a]. If q  a = b : F
we similarly get q  t b : G[b] and q  t b = u b : G[b]. Since q  G[a] = G[b], by
Lemma 2.22 q  t b = u b :G[a]. But q  u a = u b :G[a]. By symmetry and transitivity
q  t a = t b :G[a]. Thus p  t :A and p  t = u :A.
(4) Let p  A by FΣ and let p ` A_∗ Σ(x :F )G. From p ` t_ u :A we have `p t :A and we
have p ` t.1_ u.1:F and p ` t.2_ u.2:G[u.1]. By IH p  t.1:F and p  t.1 = u.1:F .
By IH p  t.2 :G[u.1] and p  t.2 = u.2 :G[u.1]. But since p  A and we have shown
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p  t.1 = u.1 : F we get p  G[t.1] = G[u.1]. By Lemma 2.22 p  t.2 : G[t.1] and
p  t.2 = u.2:G[t.1]. Thus p  t :A and p  t = u :A
(5) Let p  A by FLoc. Let p ` A _∗ E[f k], k /∈ dom(p) and p(k 7→ 0)  A and
p(k 7→ 1)  A. Since p  u :A we have p(k 7→ 0)  u :A and p(k 7→ 1)  u :A. But
we have p(k 7→ b) ` t _ u : A. By IH p(k 7→ 0)  t : A and p(k 7→ 1)  t : A and
p(k 7→ 0)  t = u : A and p(k 7→ 1)  t = u : A. By the definition p  t : A and
p  t = u :A.
Corollary 3.3. Let p ` t_∗ u :A and p  A. If p  u :A then p  t :A and p  t = u :A.
Corollary 3.4.  f :N→ N2.
Proof. It’s direct to see that  N → N2. For an arbitrary condition p let p  n : N. By
Lemma 2.10 we have a partition p C S where for each q ∈ S, q ` n_∗ m :N for some m ∈ N.
We have thus a reduction q ` f n_∗ fm :N2. If m ∈ dom(q) then q ` f n_∗ fm_ q(m) :N2
and by definition q  f n : N2. If m /∈ dom(q) then q(m 7→ 0) ` f n _∗ fm _ 0 : N2 and
q(mj 7→ 1) ` f n_∗ fm_ 1 :N2. Thus q(m 7→ 0)  f n :N2 and q(m 7→ 1)  f n :N2. By the
definition q  f n :N2. We thus have that q  f n :N2 for all q ∈ S and by locality p  f n :N2.
Let p  a = b :N. By Lemma 2.10 there is a partition p C S where for each q ∈ S,
q ` a _∗ m : N and q ` b _∗ m : N for some m ∈ N. We then have q ` f a _∗ fm : N2
and q ` f b _∗ fm :N2. If m ∈ dom(q) then q ` f a _∗ q(m) :N2 and q ` f b _∗ q(m) :N2.
By Corollary 3.3, symmetry and transitivity q  f a = f b : N2. If on the other hand
m /∈ dom(q) then q(m 7→ 0)  f a = f b :N2 and q(m 7→ 1)  f a = f b :N2. By the definition
q  f a = f b :N2. Thus q  f a = f b :N2 for all q ∈ S. By locality p  f a = f b :N2. Hence
 f :N→ N2.
Lemma 3.5. If `p t :¬A and p  A then p  t :¬A iff for all q 6 p there is no term u such
that q  u :A.
Proof. Let p  A and `p t : ¬A. We have directly that p  ¬A. Assume p  t : ¬A. If
q  u : A for some q 6 p, then q  t u : N0 which is impossible. Conversely, assume it
is the case that for all q 6 p there is no u for which q  u : A. Since r  a : A and
r  a = b : A never hold for any r 6 p, the statements “r  a : A ⇒ r  t a : N0” and
“r  a = b :A⇒ r  t a = t b :N0” hold trivially.
Lemma 3.6.  w :¬¬(Σ(x :N)IsZero(f x)).
Proof. By Lemma 3.5 it is enough to show that for all q there is no term u for which q 
u :¬(Σ(x :N)IsZero(f x)). Assume q  u :¬(Σ(x :N)IsZero(f x)) for some u. Let m /∈ dom(q)
we have then q(m 7→ 0)  (m, 0) :Σ(x :N)IsZero(f x) thus q(m 7→ 0)  u (m, 0) :N0 which is
impossible.
Let Γ := x1 :A1 . . . , xn :An and ρ := a1, . . . , an. Let Aiρ := Ai[a1/x1, . . . , ai−1/xi−1].
We write ∆ `p ρ :Γ if ∆ `p ai :Aiρ for all i. Letting σ = b1, . . . , bn, we write ∆ `p ρ = σ :Γ
if ∆ `p ai = bi :Aiρ for all i. We write p  ρ :Γ if p  ai :Aiρ for all i and p  ρ = σ :Γ if
p  ai = bi :Aiρ for all i.
Lemma 3.7. If p  ρ :Γ then `p ρ :Γ. If p  ρ = σ :Γ then `p ρ = σ :Γ.
Proof. Follows from the definition.
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Definition 3.8.
(1) We write Γ p A if Γ `p A and for all q 6 p whenever q  ρ :Γ then q  Aρ and whenever
q  ρ = σ :Γ then q  Aρ = Aσ.
(2) We write Γ p t : A if Γ `p t : A, Γ p A and for all q 6 p whenever q  ρ : Γ then
q  tρ :Aρ and whenever q  ρ = σ :Γ then q  tρ = tσ :Aρ.
(3) We write Γ p A = B if Γ `p A = B, Γ p A, Γ p B and for all q 6 p whenever q  ρ :Γ
then q  Aρ = Bρ.
(4) We write Γ p t = u :A if Γ `p t = u :A, Γ p t :A, Γ p u :A and for all q 6 p whenever
q  ρ :Γ then q  tρ = uρ :Aρ.
In the following we will show that whenever we have a rule
Γ1 `p1 J1 . . . Γ` `p` J`
Γ `p J
in
the type system then it holds that
Γ1 p1 J1 . . . Γ` p` J`
Γ p J
. Which is sufficient to show
soundness.
Lemma 3.9.
Γ p1 J . . . Γ pn J p C {p1, . . . , pn}Γ p J
Proof. Follows from Corollary 2.21.
Lemma 3.10.
Γ p F Γ, x :F p G
Γ p Π(x :F )G
Γ p F Γ, x :F p G
Γ p Σ(x :F )G
Proof. Let q 6 p and q  ρ : Γ. Let r 6 q. If r  a : Fρ, we have r  (ρ, a) : (Γ, x : F ),
thus r  Gρ[a]. If moreover r  a = b :Fρ then r  (ρ, a) = (ρ, b) : (Γ, x :F ) and we have
r  Gρ[a] = Gρ[b]. Thus q  (Π(x :F )G)ρ and q  (Σ(x :F )G)ρ
Let q  ρ = σ : Γ. We have that r  Fρ = Fσ. If r  a : Fρ then by Lemma 2.22
r  a : Fσ. Thus r  (ρ, a) = (σ, a) : (Γ, x : F ). We have r  Gρ[a] = Gσ[a]. Thus
q  (Π(x :F )G)ρ = (Π(x :F )G)σ and q  (Σ(x :F )G)ρ = (Σ(x :F )G)σ.
Lemma 3.11.
Γ p F = H Γ, x :F p G = E
Γ p Π(x :F )G = Π(x :H)E
Γ p F = H Γ, x :F p G = E
Γ p Σ(x :F )G = Σ(x :H)E
Proof. Let q 6 p and q  ρ : Γ. Similarly to Lemma 3.10, we can show q  (Σ(x :F )G)ρ,
q  (Σ(x :H)E)ρ, q  (Π(x :F )G)ρ, and q  (Π(x :H)E)ρ.
From q  Fρ = Hρ. Let r 6 q and r  a :Fρ. We have then r  (ρ, a) : (Γ, x :F ). Thus
r  Gρ[a] = Eρ[a]. Thus q  (Π(x :F )G)ρ = (Π(x :H)E)ρ and q  (Σ(x :F )G)ρ = (Σ(x :
H)E)ρ.
Lemma 3.12.
Γ, x :F p t :G
Γ p λx.t :Π(x :F )G
Proof. Let q 6 p and q  ρ : Γ. By Lemma 3.7 `q ρ : Γ. Let r 6 q and r  d :Fρ. Since
Γ, x :F `p t :G we have that x :Fρ `r tρ :Gρ. Since `r d :Fρ we have `r (λx.tρ)d = tρ[d] :
Gρ[d]. By the reduction rules (λx.tρ)d _ tρ[d]. Thus r ` (λx.tρ)d _ tρ[d] :Gρ[d]. But
r  (ρ, d) : (Γ, x :F ), hence, r  tρ[d] :Gρ[d]. By Lemma 3.2 we have that r  (λx.tρ) d :Gρ[d]
and r  (λx.tρ) d = tρ[d] :Gρ[d].
Let r  e = d :Fρ we have similarly that r  (λx.tρ) e = tρ[e] :Gρ[e]. We have also
that r  (ρ, d) = (ρ, e) :Gρ[d], thus r  tρ[d] = tρ[e] :Gρ[d] and r  Gρ[d] = Gρ[e]. By
Lemma 2.22 we have r  (λx.tρ) e = tρ[e] :Gρ[d]. By symmetry and transitivity we have
r  (λx.tρ) d = (λx.tρ) e :Gρ[d]. Thus q  (λx.t)ρ : (Π(x :F )G)ρ.
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Let q  ρ = σ : Γ. We get q  Fρ = Fσ. Similarly to the above we can show
q  (λx.t)σ : (Π(x : F )G)σ. Let r 6 q and r  a : Fρ. By Lemma 2.22 r  a : Fσ.
We then have r  (ρ, a) = (σ, a) : (Γ, x : F ). Thus we have r  Gρ[a] = Gσ[a]. Thus
q  (Π(x :F )G)ρ = (Π(x :F )G)σ and by Lemma 2.22 q  (λx.t)σ : (Π(x :F )G)ρ. We have
r  tρ[a] = tσ[a] :Gρ[a]. But r  (λx.tρ) a = tρ[a] :Gρ[a] and r  (λx.tσ)a = tσ[a] :Gσ[a].
By Lemma 2.22 r  (λx.tσ)a = tσ[a] :Gρ[a]. By Symmetry and transitivity r  (λx.tρ) a =
(λx.tσ) a :Gρ[a]. Thus q  (λx.t)ρ = (λx.t)σ : (Π(x :F )G)ρ.
Lemma 3.13.
Γ, x :F p t :G Γ p a :F
Γ p (λx.t) a = t[a] :G[a]
Proof. Let q 6 p and q  ρ :Γ. We have q  aρ :Fρ. As in Lemma 3.12 q ` ((λx.t) a)ρ _
t[a]ρ :G[a]ρ which by Lemma 3.2 imply that q  ((λx.t) a)ρ = t[a]ρ :Gρ[a].
Lemma 3.14.
Γ p g :Π(x :F )G Γ p a :F
Γ p g a :G[a]
Proof. Let q 6 p and q  ρ : Γ. We have q  gρ : (Π(x : F )G)ρ and q  aρ : Fρ. By the
definition q  (g a)ρ :G[a]ρ.
Let q  ρ = σ :Γ. We have then q  gρ = gσ : (Π(x :F )G)ρ and q  aρ = aσ :Fρ. From
the definition q  gρ aρ = gσ aρ :G[a]ρ. From the definition q  gσ aρ = gσ aσ :G[a]ρ. By
transitivity q  (g a)ρ = (g a)σ :G[a]ρ.
Lemma 3.15. (1)
Γ p g :Π(x :F )G Γ p u = v :F
Γ p g u = g v :G[u]
(2)
Γ p h = g :Π(x :F )G Γ p u :F
Γ p hu = g u :G[u]
Proof. Let q 6 p and q  ρ :Γ.
(1) We have q  gρ : (Π(x : F )G)ρ and q  uρ = vρ : Fρ. From the definition get
q  (g u)ρ = (g v)ρ :G[u]ρ.
(2) We have q  hρ = gρ : (Π(x : F )G)ρ and q  uρ : Fρ. From the definition we get
q  (hu)ρ = (g u)ρ :G[u]ρ.
Lemma 3.16.
Γ p h :Π(x :F )G Γ p g :Π(x :F )G Γ, x :F p hx = g x :G[x]
Γ p h = g :Π(x :F )G
Proof. Let q 6 p and q  ρ :Γ. We have q  hρ : (Π(x :F )G)ρ and q  gρ : (Π(x :F )G)ρ. Let
r 6 q and r  a :Fρ. We have then that r  (ρ, a) :Γ, x :F . Thus r  hρ a = gρ a :Gρ[a]. By
the definition q  hρ = gρ : (Π(x :F )G)ρ.
Lemma 3.17.
Γ, x :F p G Γ p a :F Γ p b :G[a]
Γ p (a, b) :Σ(x :F )G
Proof. Let q 6 p and q  ρ :Γ. By the typing rules Γ `q (a, b).1 = a :F and Γ `q (a, b).2 =
b :F [a]. But `q ρ :Γ. By substitution we have `q ((a, b).1)ρ = aρ :Fρ and `q ((a, b).2)ρ =
bρ :G[a]ρ. But ((a, b).1)ρ _q aρ and ((a, b).2)ρ _q bρ. Thus q ` ((a, b).1)ρ _ aρ :Fρ and
q ` ((a, b).2)ρ_ bρ :G[a]ρ. From the premise q  aρ :Fρ and q  bρ :G[a]ρ. By Lemma 3.2
q  ((a, b).1)ρ :Fρ and q  ((a, b).2)ρ :G[a]ρ. By Lemma 3.2 q  ((a, b).1)ρ = aρ :Fρ, thus
q  (ρ, aρ) = (ρ, ((a, b).1)ρ) : (Γ, x : F ). Hence q  G[a]ρ = G[(a, b).1]ρ. By Lemma 2.22
q  ((a, b).2)ρ :G[(a, b).1]ρ. By the definition we have then that q  (a, b)ρ : (Σ(x :F )G)ρ.
Let q  ρ = σ : Γ. Similarly we can show q  (a, b)σ : (Σ(x : F )G)σ. We have that
q  aρ = aσ :Fρ and q  bρ = bσ :G[a]ρ. We have also q  (ρ, aρ) = (σ, aσ) : (Γ, x :F ) we
thus have q  G[a]ρ = G[a]σ. By Lemma 3.2 q  ((a, b).2)σ = bσ :G[a]σ. By Lemma 2.22
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q  ((a, b).2)σ = bσ :G[a]ρ. But we also have by Lemma 3.2 that q  ((a, b).2)σ = aσ :Fσ.
Hence, by Lemma 2.22, we have q  ((a, b).2)σ = aσ :Fρ. By symmetry and transitivity we
then have that q  ((a, b).1)ρ = ((a, b).1)σ :Fρ and q  ((a, b).2)ρ = ((a, b).2)σ :G[(a, b).1]ρ.
Thus we have that q  (a, b)ρ = (a, b)σ : (Σ(x :F )G)ρ.
Lemma 3.18.
(1)
Γ, x :F p G Γ p t :F Γ p u :G[t]
Γ p (t, u).1 = t :F
(2)
Γ, x :F p G Γ p t :F Γ p u :G[t]
Γ p (t, u).2 = u :G[t]
Proof. Let q 6 p and q  ρ :Γ.
(1) We have `q tρ :Fρ and `q uρ :G[t]ρ. By substitution we get `q ((t, u).1)ρ = tρ :Fρ. But
((t, u).1)ρ _q tρ, thus q ` ((t, u).1)ρ _q tρ : Fρ. We have that q  tρ : Fρ. Thus by
Lemma 3.2 q  ((t, u).1)ρ :Fρ and q  ((t, u).1)ρ = tρ :Fρ.
(2) Similarly we have q  (t, u)ρ.2_ uρ :G[tρ]. Since q  uρ :G[t]ρ, by Lemma 3.2, we have
that q  ((t, u).2)ρ :G[t]ρ and q  ((t, u).2)ρ = uρ :G[tρ].
Lemma 3.19.
(1)
Γ p t :Σ(x :F )G
Γ p t.1:F
Γ p t :Σ(x :F )G
Γ p t.2:G[t.1]
(2)
Γ p t = u :Σ(x :F )G
Γ p t.1 = u.1:F
Γ p t = u :Σ(x :F )G
Γ p t.2 = u.2:G[t.1]
Proof. Let q 6 p and q  ρ :Γ.
(1) We have q  tρ : (Σ(x :F )G)ρ. By the definition we have q  (t.1)ρ :Fρ and q  (t.2)ρ :
G[t.1]ρ. Let q  ρ = σ : Γ. We have that q  tρ = tσ : (Σ(x :F )G)ρ. By the definition
q  (t.1)ρ = (t.1)σ :Fρ and q  (t.2)ρ = (t.2)σ :G[t.1]ρ.
(2) We have q  tρ = uρ : (Σ(x : F )G))ρ. By the definition q  (t.1)ρ = (u.1)ρ : Fρ and
q  (t.2)ρ = (u.2)ρ :G[t.1]ρ.
Lemma 3.20.
Γ p t :Σ(x :F )G Γ p u :Σ(x :F )G Γ p t.1 = u.1:F Γ p t.2 = u.2:G[t.1]
Γ p t = u :Σ(x :F )G
Proof. Let q 6 p and q  ρ : Γ. We have q  tρ : (Σ(x :F )G)ρ and q  uρ : (Σ(x :F )G)ρ.
We also have q  (t.1)ρ = (u.1)ρ :Fρ and q  (t.2)ρ = (u.2)ρ :G[t.1]ρ. By the definition
q  tρ = uρ : (Σ(x :F )G)ρ.
Lemma 3.21. (1)
Γ `p
Γ p N
(2)
Γ `p
Γ p 0:N
(3)
Γ p n :N
Γ p Sn :N
(4)
Γ p n = m :N
Γ p Sn = Sm :N
Proof. (1) and (2) follow directly from the definition while (3) and (4) follow from Lemma 2.10
and locality.
Lemma 3.22.
Γ, x :N p F Γ p a0 :F [0] Γ p g :Π(x :N)(F [x]→ F [Sx])
Γ p recN(λx.F ) a0 g :Π(x :N)F
Proof. Let q 6 p and q  ρ :Γ. We have then that q ` ρ :Γ, hence, `q (recN(λx.F )ρ a0 g)ρ :
(Π(x : N)F )ρ. Let r 6 q. Let r  a : N, r  b : N and r  a = b : N. By Lemma 2.10
there is a partition r C S such that for each s ∈ S, s ` a _∗ n : N and s ` b _∗ n : N.
In order to show that q  (recN(λx.F ) a0 g)ρ : (Π(x : N)F )ρ we need to show that r 
(recN(λx.F ) a0 g)ρ a :Fρ[a], r  (recN(λx.F ) a0 g)ρ b :Fρ[b], and r  recN(λx.F ) a0 g)ρ a =
(recN(λx.F ) a0 g)ρ b : Fρ[a]. By locality it will be sufficient to show that for each s ∈
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S we have s  (recN(λx.F ) a0 g)ρ a : Fρ[a], s  (recN(λx.F ) a0 g)ρ b : Fρ[b], and s 
(recN(λx.F ) a0 g)ρ a = (recN(λx.F ) a0 g)ρ bρ :Fρ[a]. We have that
s ` (recN(λx.F ) a0 g)ρ a_∗ (recN(λx.F ) a0 g)ρn :Fρ[a]
s ` (recN(λx.F ) a0 g)ρ b_∗ (recN(λx.F ) a0 g)ρn :Fρ[b]
Let n := Sk 0. By induction on k. If k = 0 then
s ` (recN(λx.F ) a0 g)ρ a_∗ (recN(λx.F ) a0 g)ρ 0_ a0ρ :Fρ[a]
s ` (recN(λx.F ) a0 g)ρ b_∗ (recN(λx.F ) a0 g)ρ 0_ a0ρ :Fρ[b]
By Lemma 2.22 we have then that
s  (recN(λx.F ) a0 g)ρ a = a0ρ :Fρ[a] s  (recN(λx.F ) a0 g)ρ b = a0ρ :Fρ[b]
Since s  a = b :N we have s  (ρ, a) = (ρ, b) : (Γ, x :N) and thus s  Fρ[a] = Fρ[b].
By Lemma 2.22, symmetry and transitivity s  (recN(λx.F ) a0 g)ρ a = (recN(λx.F ) a0 g)ρ b :
Fρ[a].
Assume the statement holds for k ≤ `. Let n = S `. We have then
s ` (recN(λx.F ) a0 g)ρ a_∗ gρ ` ((recN(λx.F ) a0 g)ρ `) :Fρ[S `]
s ` (recN(λx.F ) a0 g)ρ b_∗ gρ ` ((recN(λx.F ) a0 g)ρ `) :Fρ[S `]
By IH s  ((recN(λx.F ) a0 g)ρ `) :Fρ[`]. But we have Γ p g : Π(x :N)(F [x] → F [Sx]) and
thus s  (gρ) ` ((recN(λx.F ) a0 g)ρ `) :Fρ[S `]. By Corollary 3.3, symmetry and transitivity
we get that s  (recN(λx.F ) a0 g)ρ a : Fρ[S `], s  (recN(λx.F ) a0 g)ρ b : Fρ[S `], and s 
(recN(λx.F ) a0 g)ρ a = (recN(λx.F ) a0 g)ρ b :Fρ[S `]. But s  a = S ` :N, thus, s  Fρ[a] =
Fρ[S `]. By Lemma 2.22 we get then that s  (recN(λx.F ) a0 g)ρ a = (recN(λx.F ) a0 g)ρ b :
Fρ[a].
As indicated above, this is sufficient to show q  (recN(λx.F ) a0 g)ρ :Π(x :N)Fρ.
Given q  ρ = σ :Γ. Similarly we can show q  (recN(λx.F ) a0 g)σ :Π(x :N)Fσ.
To show that q  (recN(λx.F ) a0 g)ρ = (recN(λx.F ) a0 g)σ : Π(x : N)Fρ we need to
show that whenever r  a : Fρ for some r 6 q we have r  (recN(λx.F ) a0 g)ρ a =
(recN(λx.F ) a0 g)σ a :Fρ[a]. Let r  a :F for r 6 q. By Lemma 2.10 we have a partition
r C S where for each s ∈ S we have s ` a _∗ n : N. As above it is sufficient to show
s  (recN(λx.F ) a0 g)ρ a = (recN(λx.F ) a0 g)σ a :Fρ[a] for all s ∈ S.
Let n := Sk 0. By induction on k. If k = 0 then as above
s  (recN(λx.F ) a0 g)ρ a = a0ρ :Fρ[a] s  (recN(λx.F ) a0 g)σ a = a0σ :Fσ[b]
Since r  ρ = σ : Γ we have s  (ρ, a) = (σ, a) : (Γ, x : N). We have then that
s  Fρ[a] = Fσ[a]. But we also have that s  a0ρ = a0σ :Fρ[a]. By Lemma 2.22, symmetry
and transitivity it then follows that s  (recN(λx.F ) a0 g)ρ a = (recN(λx.F ) a0 g)σ a :Fρ[a].
Assume the statement holds for k ≤ `. Let n = S `. As before we have that
s ` (recN(λx.F ) a0 g)ρ a_∗ gρ ` ((recN(λx.F ) a0 g)ρ `) :Fρ[S `]
s ` (recN(λx.F ) a0 g)σ a_∗ gσ ` ((recN(λx.F ) a0 g)σ `) :Fσ[S `]
By IH s  (recN(λx.F ) a0 g)ρ ` = (recN(λx.F ) a0 g)σ ` : Fρ[`]. But s  gρ = gσ : (Π(x :
N)(F [x] → F [Sx]))ρ, thus s  gρ ` ((recN(λx.F ) a0 g)ρ `) = gσ ` ((recN(λx.F ) a0 g)σ `) :
Fρ[S `]
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But s  Fρ[S `] = Fσ[S `] and ri  Fρ[a] = Fρ[S `]. By Lemma 2.22, symmetry and
transitivity we have then that s  (recN(λx.F ) a0 g)ρ a = (recN(λx.F ) a0 g)σ a :Fρ[a]
Which is sufficient to show q  (recN(λx.F ) a0 g)ρ = (recN(λx.F ) a0 g)σ :Π(x :N)Fρ
Lemma 3.23.
Γ, x :N ` F Γ p a0 :F [0] Γ p g :Π(x :N)(F [x]→ F [Sx])
Γ p recN(λx.F ) a0 g 0 = a0 :F [0]
Proof. Let q 6 p and q  ρ :Γ. We have `q ρ :Γ and thus we get that `q (recN(λx.F ) a0 g 0)ρ =
a0ρ : Fρ[0]. But (recN(λx.F ) a0 g 0)ρ _ a0ρ. Thus q ` (recN(λx.F ) a0 g 0)ρ _ a0ρ : Fρ[0].
But q  a0ρ :Fρ[0]. By Lemma 3.2 we have q  (recN(λx.F ) a0 g 0)ρ = a0ρ :Fρ[0].
Lemma 3.24.
Γ, x :N p F Γ p a0 :F [0] Γ p n :N Γ p g :Π(x :N)(F [x]→ F [Sx])
Γ p recN(λx.F ) a0 g (Sn) = g n (recN(λx.F ) a0 g n) :F [Sn]
Proof. Let q 6 p and q  ρ :Γ. We have q  nρ :N. By Lemma 2.10 there is a partition q C S
such that for each s ∈ S there is m ∈ N and s ` nρ_∗ m :N. Thus s ` Snρ_∗ Sm :N. We
have then that
s `(recN(λx.F ) a0 g (Sn))ρ_∗ (recN(λx.F ) a0 g)ρ (Sm)_∗ gρm ((recN (λx.F ) a0 g)ρm) :Fρ[Sm]
But s ` (g n (recN(λx.F ) a0 g n))ρ_∗ gρm ((recN (λx.F ) a0 g)ρm) :Fρ[Sm]. By Corol-
lary 3.3, symmetry and transitivity s  (recN(λx.F ) a0 g (Sn))ρ = (g n (recN(λx.F ) a0 g n))ρ :
Fρ[Sm].
Since s  nρ = m :N we have that s  Fρ[Sm] = Fρ[Snρ]. By Lemma 2.22 we thus
have that s  (recN(λx.F ) a0 g (Sn))ρ = (g n (recN(λx.F ) a0 g n))ρ :F [Sn]ρ.
By locality q  (recN(λx.F ) a0 g (Sn))ρ = (g n (recN(λx.F ) a0 g n))ρ :F [Sn]ρ
Lemma 3.25.
Γ, x :N p F = G Γ p a0 = b0 :F [0] Γ p g = h :Π(x :N)(F [x]→ F [Sx])
Γ p recN(λx.F ) a0 g = recN(λx.G) b0 h :Π(x :N)F
Proof. The proof follows by an argument similar to that used to prove Lemma 3.22.
For the congruence rules, soundness follows from Theorem 2.11. Soundness for rules of
N0, N1 and N2 follow similarly to those of N. Soundness for the rules of U follows similarly
to soundness of typing rules. We have then the following corollary:
Corollary 3.26 (Soundness). If Γ `p J then Γ p J
Theorem 3.27 (Fundamental Theorem). If `p J then p  J .
Proof. Follows from Corollary 3.26.
4. Markov’s principle
Now we have enough machinery to show the independence of MP from type theory. The
idea is that if a judgment J is derivable in type theory (i.e. ` J) then it is derivable in the
forcing extension (i.e. `∅ J) and by Theorem 3.27 it holds in the interpretation (i.e.  J). It
thus suffices to show that there no t such that  t :MP to establish the independence of MP
from type theory. First we recall the formulation of MP.
MP := Π(h :N→ N2)[¬¬(Σ(x :N) IsZero (hx))→ Σ(x :N) IsZero (hx)]
where IsZero :N2 → U is given by IsZero := λy.recN2(λx.U)N1 N0 y.
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Lemma 4.1. There is no term t such that  t :Σ(x :N) IsZero (f x).
Proof. Assume  t : Σ(x : N) IsZero (f x) for some t. We then have  t.1 : N and  t.2 :
IsZero (f t.1). By Lemma 2.10 one has a partition ∅ C S where for each q ∈ S, q ` t.1_∗ m :N.
Hence q ` IsZero (f t.1) _∗ IsZero (fm) and by Lemma 3.1 q  IsZero (f t.1) = IsZero (fm).
But, by definition, the partition S must contain a condition, say r, such that r(k) = 1
whenever k ∈ dom(r) (this holds vacuously for ∅ C {∅}). Let r ` t.1 _∗ n :N. Assume
n ∈ dom(r), then r ` IsZero (f t.1) _∗ IsZero (f n) _∗ N0. By monotonicity, from  t.2 :
IsZero (f t.1) we get r  t.2: IsZero (f t.1). But r ` IsZero (f t.1)_∗ N0 thus r  IsZero (f t.1) =
N0. Hence, by Lemma 2.22, r  t.2 : N0 which is impossible, thus contradicting our
assumption. If on the other hand n /∈ dom(r) then, since r C {r(n 7→ 0), r(n 7→ 1)}, we can
apply the above argument with r(n 7→ 1) instead of r.
Lemma 4.2. There is no term t such that  t :MP.
Proof. Assume  t :MP for some t. From the definition, whenever  g :N → N2 we have
 t g :¬¬(Σ(x :N) IsZero (g x))→ Σ(x :N) IsZero (g x). Since by Corollary 3.4,  f :N→ N2
we have  t f : ¬¬(Σ(x : N) IsZero (f x)) → Σ(x : N) IsZero (f x). Since by Lemma 3.6
 w :¬¬(Σ(x :N) IsZero (f x)) we have  (t f)w : Σ(x :N) IsZero (f x) which is impossible by
Lemma 4.1.
From Theorem 3.27, Lemma 4.2, and Lemma 1.3 we can then conclude:
Theorem 1.1. There is no term t such that MLTT ` t :MP.
4.1. Many Cohen reals. We extend the type system in Section 1 further by adding a
generic point fq for each condition q. The introduction and conversion rules for fq are given
by:
Γ `p
Γ `p fq :N→ N2
Γ `p
n ∈ dom(q)
Γ `p fq n = 1
Γ `p
n /∈ dom(q), n ∈ dom(p)
Γ `p fq n = p(n)
With the reduction rules
n ∈ dom(q)
fq n→ 1
n /∈ dom(q), n ∈ dom(p)
fq n→p p(n)
We observe that with these added rules the reduction relation is still monotone. For each fq
we add a term:
Γ `p
Γ `p wq :¬¬(Σ(x :N) IsZero (fq x))
Finally we add a term mw witnessing the negation of MP
Γ `p
Γ `p mw :¬MP
By analogy to Corollary 3.4 we have
Lemma 4.3.  fq :N→ N2 for all q.
Lemma 4.4.  wq :¬¬(Σ(x :N) IsZero (fq x)) for all q.
Proof. Assume p  t :¬(Σ(x :N)IsZero (fq x)) for some p and t. Let m /∈ dom(q) ∪ dom(p),
we have p(m 7→ 0)  fqm = 0. Thus p(m 7→ 0)  (m, 0) : Σ(x : N) IsZero (fq x) and
p(m 7→ 0)  t (m, 0) :N0 which is impossible.
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Lemma 4.5. There is no term t for which q  t :Σ(x :N) IsZero (fq x).
Proof. Assume q  t : Σ(x : N) IsZero (fq x) for some t. We then have q  t.1 : N and
q  t.2: IsZero (fq t.1). By Lemma 2.10 one has a partition q C {q1, . . . , qn} where for each i,
t.1_∗qi mi for some mi ∈ N. Hence qi ` IsZero (fq t.1)_∗ IsZero (fqmi) . But any partition
of q contain a condition, say qj , where qj(k) = 1 whenever k /∈ dom(q) and k ∈ dom(qj).
Assume mj ∈ dom(qj). If mj ∈ dom(q) then qj ` fqmj _ 1 : N2 and if mj /∈ dom(q)
then qj ` fqmj _ qj(k) := 1 : N2. Thus qj ` IsZero (fq t.1) _∗ N0 and by Lemma 3.1
qj  IsZero (f t.1) = N0. From  t.2 : IsZero (f t.1) by monotonicity and Lemma 2.22 we
have qj  t.2 : N0 which is impossible. If on the other hand mj /∈ dom(qj) then since
qj C {qj(mj 7→ 0), qj(mj 7→ 1)} we can apply the above argument with qj(mj 7→ 1) instead
of qj .
Lemma 4.6.  mw :¬MP
Proof. Assume p  t :MP for some p and t. Thus whenever q 6 p and q  u :N→ N2 then
q  t u : ¬¬(Σ(x : N) IsZero (ux)) → (Σ(x : N) IsZero (ux)). But we have q  fq : N → N2
by Lemma 4.3. Hence q  t fq : ¬¬(Σ(x : N)IsZero (fq x)) → (Σ(x : N)IsZero (fq x)). But
q  wq : ¬¬(Σ(x : N)IsZero (fq x)) by Lemma 4.4. Thus q  (t fq)wq : Σ(x : N) IsZero (fq x)
which is impossible by Lemma 4.5.
We have then that this extension is sound with respect to the interpretation. Hence we
have shown the following statement.
Theorem 4.7. There is a consistent extension of MLTT where ¬MP is derivable.
Recall that dne := Π(A :U)(¬¬A→ A). We have then a term ` t :dne→ MP. Thus in
this extension we have a term `∅ λx.mw (t x) :¬dne.
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